نص البرقيات التي نشرها موقع ويكيليكس والمسربة من السفارة الامريكية في تونس

نص البرقيات التي نشرها موقع ويكيليكس والمسربة من السفارة الامريكية في تونس
ويلاحظ أن السفارة الامريكية مطلعة على كل ما يحدث في تونس من تعذيب سرقات استبداد بالتفاصيل المملة
تقييمها للوضع السياسي في البلاد أكثر تشاؤما من أكثر المعارضين تشاؤما: انظر البرقية الاخيرة حيث يقول السفير انه لا أمل لتونس في التغيير ما دام بن علي رئيسا لها

US-Tunisian Joint Military Commission produces better tunisian briefings but many det
ails still lacking November 27th, 2010
09TUNIS314 Date21/05/2009 05:14 OriginEmbassy Tunis ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #0314/01 1411714
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 211714Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6315
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

Content
S E C R E T TUNIS 000314
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DOD FOR OSD (DASD WHELAN) AND OSD/ISA/NESA
STATE FOR PM/RSAT(DANIELEWSKI) NEA/MAG (HAYES)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2019
TAGS: MASS, MARR, PREL, TS
SUBJECT: US-TUNISIAN JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION PRODUCES BETTER TUNISIAN BRIEFINGS BUT MANY DETAILS STILL LACKING
Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
Summary
-------
1. (C) The May 11-13 US-Tunisian Joint Military Commission (JMC) saw productive exchanges on a variety of topics relating to bilateral military cooperation. The Tunisians were more forthcoming than they have been in recent years about their priorities with respect to military assistance needs, although they did not provide a comprehensive planning document laying out these priorities in detail and how they intendto use Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and other means to meet them. In the coming weeks, the Mission will review FMF and other US assistance here in light of the JMC and other developments in US-Tunisian bilateral relations, including issues related to the American Cooperative School of Tunis. End Summary.
-----------------
Setting the Stage
-----------------
2. (C) On May 7, prior to the formal commencement of the 24th US-Tunisian JMC, DASD Whelan met with Defense Minister Morjane. In this meeting, both Morjane and Whelan expressed appreciation for the long-standing military cooperation between our two countries, noting our historic relationship and friendly ties. Morjane was particularly grateful for the provision of ground surveillance radar (GSR) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which will help the Tunisian military patrol the border. Whelan made clear that the United States Government was pleased to be able to help Tunisia better secure its borders. She noted, however, that the current economic environment would have an impact on foreign assistance. "We may not be able to sustain" current levels of military assistance to Tunisia, she explained.
3. (C) DASD Whelan underscored that the economic crisis made it all the more important for th USG to understand Tunisian military needs and prorities, explaining that such information is criical to US planning and delivery of military assstance. In addition, she addressed the need to ave regular communications, to ensure that the US-unisian military partnership stays strong and effctive. (Note: She did not specifically mention S disappointment or the conditions imposed by he GOT on the ATLAS DROP exercise, but it was clar that this incident was symptomatic of the problem to which she was alluding.) Morjane agreed, bu noted that Tunisia's relatively small military mposes constraints on the number of commitments hat they can take on. He specified that Tunisiahas 11 joint military commissions with various cuntries, including one just created with Belgium nd noted that during the last year the Tunisian ilitary had taken part in over 300 military actiities, including 100 days, worth of activities wit the United States. Whelan said the United Stats was interested more in the quality of the relationship, rather than the quantity of joint activities.
4. (S/NF) Follown their 30-minute meeting, DASD Whelan and DefMi Morjane adjourned to his office for a restricted meeting, which also included Ambassador Godec on he US side;
and Director General for Military Seurity Brigadier General Mohamed Meddeb, Colonel bdelkader Adouni, and Major Chiheb Khelifa on theTunisian side. Morjane and Whelan repeated the hemes addressed in the broader meeting, with Whela underscoring that the USG needs more precision bout Tunisia's requirements to better guard against the threat posed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. General Meddeb opined that better military-military intelligence cooperation would help. He recalled that in the 1980's the United States used to provide daily updates about Soviet ship movements in the Mediterranean, suggesting that this kind of information-sharing was an appropriate model. Whalen said the US side would seek to strengthen this area.
---------------------------
Productive Working Sessions
---------------------------
5. (C) The JMC itself proceeded as planned, with positive but quite general exchanges in the plenary, with more detailed briefings in the Subcommittees on Security Assistance and on Military Cooperation. (Note: The minutes of these sessions have been emailed to PM/RSAT and NEA/MAG.) US participants
described the Tunisian briefings as "more forthcoming than ever," but still not quite reaching the level of precision that the US side requires for planning purposes.
Specifically, the Tunisians did not provide a comprehensive five-year planning document laying out in detail their military assistance priorities and how they intend to use FMF and other means to meet them.
6. (SBU) Highlights of the working sessions included:
-- A briefing on the Tunisian Army's top military assistance priorities, i.e., light weapons, individual protection, NVDs, GPS, laser range finders, aiming point devices, HWMMW and shelters, chemical gear, EOD gear, parachutes, and support vehicles.
-- A briefing on the Tunisian Air Force's top priorities, i.e., upgrading F5 and T53 engines and C130 pilot training.
Secondary priority was given to EDA C130H and SH-60, J85-21C engines for the F5 and T56 engines for C130, sustainment of the UH-1, upgrade for the C130B, a UH-1H simulator, and initial pilot training for graduating cadets.
-- The Tunisian side also requested as a top priority two Protector Class (or equivalent 25 meter) coastal patrol boats, which the Tunisian military intends to supplement with an additional two coastal patrol boats by FY12.
-- The Tunisian side briefed on the Tunisian medical organization, requesting US assistance for its intensive care unit and burn unit, as well as in the area of aerospace physiology.
-- The Tunisian side briefed on the military's civilian development/engineering project in R'Jim Maatoug, located south of Kebili. Both in Morjane's plenary statement and in the more detailed briefing in the military cooperation subcommittee, the project was held up as a model for potential US-Tunisian cooperation in humanitarian assistance.
The US side expressed openness to considering future projects in conjunction with the Tunisian Ministry of Defense along the lines of the R'Jim Maatoug project, which the Italians helped fund.
-- On the US side, the Tunisians welcomed the briefing on the Scan Eagle Unmanned Air System, noting that a site survey by the US program office would be required to better assess support requirements. After repeated requests, the Tunisians permitted a site visit along the Tunisian-Algerian border to review issues related to deployment of GSRs and UAVs. The Tunisians were invited to observe as part of AFRICOM's mil-mil program the US Marine Corps exercise Mohave Viper at 29 Palms training area in California June 1-4, 2009 where USMC employs Scan Eagle UAV as part of its predeployment training. (Note: The Tunisian Military accepted this offer on May 20, sending the Embassy the names of two Air Force officers.)
-------
Comment
-------
7. (C) Although the session was productive, and the Tunisian side more forthcoming than it has been in recent years about its priorities with respect to military assistance needs, there was still an absence of precision in some of the Tunisian briefings. In the coming weeks, the Mission will review FMF and other US assistance here in light of the JMC and other developments in US-Tunisian bilateral relations, including the future of the American Cooperative School of Tunis. End Comment.
8. (SBU) DASD Whelan did not have a chance to clear this cable prior to departing Post.
Please visit Embassy Tunis' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/tunis/index.c fm
Godec
Tags: Joint Military Commission Army Foreign Military Financing Kamel Morjane Chiheb Khelifa AQMI Al Qaeda Robert F. Godec Mohamed Meddeb Abdelkader Adouni

Posted in Security | Comments(0)»
Got offers negotiations on American School, But slaps ambassador's wrist for "Politicizing" the issue November 27th, 2010
09TUNIS223 Date08/04/2009 07:49 OriginEmbassy Tunis ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
VZCZCXRO2970

OO RUEHDBU
RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTU #0223/01 0981949
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081949Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6188
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0231

Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TUNIS 000223
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO - HUDSON; NEA/MAG; NEA/SCA/EX;
STATE ALSO FOR A/OPR/OS - CAMERON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2019
TAGS: ASCH, OFDP, PREL, TS
SUBJECT: GOT OFFERS NEGOTIATIONS ON AMERICAN SCHOOL, BUT SLAPS AMBASSADOR'S WRIST FOR "POLITICIZING" THE ISSUE
REF: TUNIS 217 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
Summary
-------
1. (S/NF) In back-to-back meetings at the Foreign Ministry today the Ambassador was given a letter from Foreign Minister Abdallah to NEA AA/S Feltman offering negotiations to resolve the American Cooperative School in Tunis (ACST) tax issue.
The letter emphasized that the GOT wants to maintain friendly relations with the United States and views the school tax issue as a technical, fiscal matter. The Ambassador welcomed this opening and the prospect of negotiations, but asked the MOF to rescind the final tax decree to prevent the school's closure. His Tunisian interlocutors were dismissive about the looming May 23 deadline for payment, saying, "No one wants to close the school." On his way back to the Embassy, the Ambassador was asked to return to the Ministry. The Minister's Special Assistant, Mohamed Lessir, who had been in the first meeting, reprimanded the Ambassador for having politicized the issue by contacting several third parties, including the African Development Bank and European Ambassadors. Lessir also took issue that GRPO had raised the ACST matter with its security contacts. The Ambassador firmly rejected the assertion that it was the United States that had politicized the issue. He explained that his contacts with key stakeholders were only natural, given the schools impending forced closure. The content of these meetings represents the first clear indication that the GOT is ready to negotiate. We should take them up on their offer, and quickly. We have forwarded to NEA/MAG a draft text for Acting A/S Feltman. End Summary.
----------------------------------
FM Response to AA/S Feltman Letter
----------------------------------
2. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chief of Staff Mahmoud Khemiri summoned the Ambassador for the second day in a row to discuss the ACST issue. Once again accompanied by Special Assistant to the Minister and Director General for Europe Mohamed Lessir, as well as Elyes Kasri, Director General for the Americas and Asia, Khemiri presented a letter from Foreign Minister Abdallah to AA/S Feltman, responding to AA/S Feltman's April 6 letter to Appointed Ambassador Mansour in Washington. The text of the original Arabic letter, along with Embassy's unofficial translation, have been emailed to NEA/MAG. The FM's letter :
-- emphasized the over 200 years of friendly relations the United States and Tunisia have enjoyed and noted that the GOT is keen on that friendship continuing;
-- argued that the tax matter faced by ACST is a fiscal and "purely technical" issue with no political aspect, and noted surprise that AA/S Feltman's letter alluded to possible impacts on bilateral relations, which "cannot be impacted by these technical issues";
-- expressed the readiness of the GOT to receive fiscal and legal experts from the United States as soon as possible for discussions with Tunisian fiscal authorities about the ACST issue; and
-- confirmed that the GOT is ready for dialogue to search for a solution concerning the fiscal status of the school and the lease contract in the framework of an agreement that clarifies the rights and duties of all parties.
---------------
Let's Negotiate
---------------
3. (C) The Ambassador thanked the Chief of Staff for the response, noting that he would transmit it to Washington. He reiterated that the United States stands ready to take part in negotiations with the GOT to resolve the issue. He emphasized, however, that such negotiations should take place in the context of discussions to clarify the school's status, and with an appreciation of 50 years of diplomatic exchanges and practice regarding the school. In addition, the Finance Ministry should, as a preliminary step, rescind its unilateral final tax decree. All of these issues could be
TUNIS 00000223 002 OF 003
taken up -- and resolved amicably -- in the context of bilateral negations.
--------------
What Deadline?
--------------
4. (C) Lessir asked whether ACST planned to exercise its right to sue the GOT. The Ambassador demurred, noting that the school is still weighing its options. The Ambassador reiterated though, that ACST will not be able to come up with even the approximately 4 million Tunisian Dinars that the MOF has said is not subject to deferment in the case of a legal suit. Lessir was dismissive about the looming deadline, noting that there are "several weeks" before May 23. The Ambassador pointed out that the GOT would have the legal authority to padlock the property and seize any valuables in the case of non-payment beginning on May 23.
-------
Take II
-------
5. (S/NF) As the Ambassador was on his way back to the Embassy, he received an urgent phone call to return to the Ministry for a meeting with the Foreign Minister. As it turned out, the second meeting was with Lessir, who was clearly performing on instruction from the Minister. Lessir, adopting a very serious tone, said that information had "come to the Ministry's attention" suggesting that the Ambassador had been in contact with the African Development Bank, other Ambassadors, and parents of ACST schoolchildren. He reprimanded the Ambassador for these contacts, noting that the German Ambassador had already called him to make an "urgent" intervention on this issue. Lessir also expressed displeasure over the fact that GRPO had raised the ACST issue with security contacts. These acts were unfortunate, Lessir said, and constituted politicization of what was a "purely technical" issue. This should have been a last resort, he said, and we're not yet at the point of last resort. The GOT's doors were always open, he continued. "We would have preferred to have kept these discussions between us."
-----------
Why? Why??
-----------
6. (C) Lessir said he couldn't understand why the United States take the discussion to third parties "Just tell me why," Lessir implored, dramatically. The Ambassador turned the tables on Lessir, saying, "Just tell me why, when there are so many communications between the Embassy and the GOT on the school, including a 1984 MFA diplomatic note specifying that teachers' salaries are not subject to tax, why does this mean nothing?"
-------------
No Blame Here
-------------
7. (C) The Ambassador was unapologetic for his consultations with key stakeholders in ACST. He reminded Lessir that the school was facing imminent forced closure, due to its inability to pay even the down payment of the assessed arrears by May 23. In the face of this sword of Damocles, the school -- and the USG -- had no choice but to prepare for the worst case scenario -- the forced closure of the school.
It would have been irresponsible to have not consulted with key stakeholders. The Ambassador advised Lessir that consultations with parents have not yet taken place, but that many are already aware of the situation; a general meeting is planned for Friday, April 17. The Ambassador also rejected Lessir's assertion that the United States had politicized the issue. Notwithstanding the GOT's protestations that tax issue was a technical matter, it jeopardized the very existence of ACST, which made it a political matter for us.
The Ambassador pointed out that throughout the build-up of this crisis, he had repeatedly made clear to his Tunisian interlocutors that they were provoking a crisis.
-----------------------------
Briefing European Ambassadors
-----------------------------
8. (C) After the MFA meetings, the Ambassador informed the German and several other EU Ambassadors of the new
TUNIS 00000223 003 OF 003
developments. All welcomed the possibility of progress, but agreed that we need (collectively) to keep the pressure on the GOT to resolve the ACST issue once and for all.
-------
Comment
-------
9. (C) Lessir's theatrical performance, while tedious, is evidence that our actions in Washington and Tunis have finally gotten the GOT's attention. Moreover, as the Ambassador noted in his second meeting with Lessir, Abdallah's letter represents the first clear indication that the GOT is willing to negotiate with the goal of resolving this matter in a mutually agreeable fashion. We should take them up on this offer, but stick to the condition that the MOF first rescind the final tax decree. Post will transmit to NEA/MAG recommended language for a response to the Abdallah letter. End Comment.
Please visit Embassy Tunis' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/tunis/index.c fm
Godec
Tags: Robert F. Godec American School Abdalwahab Abdallah Mahmoud Khemiri Jeffrey Feltman Foreign Ministry Diplomacy Mohamed Lessir Corruption Leila Trabelsi

Posted in Family Affairs Politics | Comments(0)»
ICRC: Treatment of prisoners in Ministry of interior facilities a concern November 27th, 2010
09TUNIS399 Date18/06/2009 05:58 OriginEmbassy Tunis ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
P 181758Z JUN 09

FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6455
INFO MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

Content
S E C R E T TUNIS 000399
NOFORN
STATE FOR NEA/MAG (SWILLIAMS, MHAYES, JPATTERSON)
DRL: KMCGEENEY, S/WCI: ARICCI
DOD/OSD:ALIOTTA, DOJ/ODAG:MSTRANSKY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2028
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PTER, KDRG, TS
SUBJECT: ICRC: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS IN MOI FACILITIES A CONCERN
Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
------
Summary
-------
1. (S/NF) The International Red Cross Committee Regional (ICRC) Delegate Yves Arnoldy told the Ambassador ICRC priorities in Tunisia are overcrowding in general and treatment of prisoners in MOI facilities. The ICRC has a good working relationship with the Ministry of Justice, but the Ministry of Interior will take more time. He confirmed that the ICRC has access to some notified MOI facilities and was trying to get information about non-notified facilities. He also said, if offered the chance to make a recommendation about the transfer of Tunisian detainees held in Guantanamo back to Tunisia that he, "would not like to be in the Ambassador's place." End Summary.
---------------------
Guantanamo Detainees
---------------------
2. (S) The Ambassador met recently with ICRC Delegate Yves Arnoldy to obtain an update on the organization's activities in Tunisia and the region.
3. (S/NF) Discussing the Guantanamo detention facility, the Ambassador stressed President Obama's intention to close the facility by the end of the year. He said the question of transferring the Tunisian detainees back to Tunisia was under review in Washington and asked what Arnoldy would recommend if he had the opportunity. Arnoldy responded, obliquely saying, it was a difficult decision and he "would not like to be in the Ambassador's place." He asked to be kept informed about the status of any potential transferees because ICRC is in touch with their families in Tunisia and will keep them informed. ICRC will also be testing a video conferencing capability soon to improve communications between detainees still in Guantanamo and their families.
---------------
ICRC Activities
---------------
4. (S/NF) Arnoldy said the ICRC is focused on the long-term in Tunisia. It was only allowed access to prisoners in 2005.
It is a question of building trust, which takes time, but relations have reached an, "interesting level with solid ground for development particularly with the Ministry of Justice." The ICRC has two tracks it is working on, overcrowding in general, and treatment of prisoners in facilities under MOI control.
------------------
Relations with MOJ
------------------
5. (S/NF) Arnoldy said the ICRC relations with the Ministry of Justice are cooperative. He had direct contact whenever he needed it with his interlocutors up to the Minister, and there were clear signs of political will to cooperate on prison inspections. The MOJ is ready to take advantage of the resources ICRC has to offer and is becoming interested in a dialogue on wider issues of justice. He could see possibilities to develop activities with the MOJ beyond just treatment of prisoners to a more strategic, structural level, including training of staff and exchange of ideas with other national systems. When asked by the Ambassador if he could confirm if the MOI had access to prisoners held in MOJ facilities he said he could not add any information to this, but then added, that certain ministries have the ability to affect the MOJ system.
-------------------
Relations with MOI
-------------------
6. (S/NF) Arnoldy characterized ICRC relations with the MOI as "needing improvement." The ICRC is taking a step-by-step approach and the level of dialogue has made some progress since the beginning. However, changing treatment is a long-term issue that will entail changes in the MOJ's attitude and "mentality." The ICRC is seeking to improve the dialogue and develop the basis for adding more substance.
Arnoldy confirmed that the ICRC has access to "notified" MOI facilities and was trying to get information about "non-notified" facilities.
----------------------
Relations with the MFA
----------------------
7. (C) Arnoldy said he has to double track his meeting requests with the Ministry of Justice via diplomatic note to the MFA however the MFA does not block or delay his requests.
He noted that his relationship with the MFA had declined somewhat after the departure of Hatem Ben Salim who was the Secretary of State for European Affairs until 2008.
------------------------
NGO Reports of Treatment
------------------------
8. (S/NF) The Ambassador asked Arnoldy for his impression of the reliability of information on treatment of prisoners provided by NGOs and others without direct access to the prisoners. He asked if the ICRC questioned their public statements about treatment. Arnoldy said, it is difficult for NGOs and others to know exactly what is happening and third hand sourcing has its problems. Not everything they say is accurate, but it is a source of information. They often give him tips that he can follow-up on or verify and sometimes they do have good sources, especially through contact with prisoners' families.
------------------
Regional Activities
------------------
9. (S/NF) The Ambassador asked for an overview of the ICRC office's regional activities, which Arnoldy is responsible for, in brief:
-- Libya - Relations are difficult. Arnoldy has a hard time visiting Libya because of his Swiss passport and the strained relations between Libya and Switzerland. ICRC depends on Tunisian staff going to Libya or Libyans coming to Tunisia.
-- Mauritania - The ICRC has signed a headquarters agreement with Mauritania upgrading their status to a mission but the office will still answer to the Tunis office. There are approximately 1,200 prisoners in Mauritania.
-- Morocco - ICRC has a presence in Morocco but does not have any diplomatic status. Therefore the Morocco office focuses on issues of international humanitarian law. The rest of ICRC activities are handled through the Tunis office.
Morocco is the biggest file in the region, concerned mainly individuals who "disappeared" as a result of the Western Sahara conflict. ICRC is discussing up-grading its status with the government of Morocco, it is just a question of time. When they reach an agreement, ICRC will likely open several offices in Morocco which will not be dependent on the Tunis office.
10. (U) Arnoldy expressed the ICRC's appreciation for USG support for the organization. The ICRC depends on donors to support it so it can react quickly in a crisis and not wait until it has confirmed funding before taking action.
-------
Comment
-------
11. (S/NF) Arnoldy was as frank as he could be given the confidentiality policy of the ICRC. It was clear that he was not positive about the prison conditions in the MOI facilities nor about the MOI's attitude toward cooperating with the ICRC. He did say however, that some progress had been made in the ICRC-MOI dialogue but that it would take time. Given that ICRC is the only international organization with reliable access to the prisons, we have to give weight to their comments, even if cryptic.
Godec
Tags: Guantanamo Terrorism Torture Detainees Libya Switzerland Mauritania Morocco ICRC Ministry of Interior The International Red Cross Committee Ministry of Justice Hatem Ben Salim Yves Arnoldy Barak Obama Human Rights

Posted in Security | Comments(0)»
Biographic update on Sakher El Matri, genial interlocutor, raising his profile November 27th, 2010
09TUNIS338 Date03/06/2009 04:35 OriginEmbassy Tunis ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #0338 1541635
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031635Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6339
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
Content
S E C R E T TUNIS 000338

NOFORN
SIPDIS
NEA/MAG FOR (MHAYES, JPATTERSON)
AND INR (TKING)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2019
TAGS: PINR, PGOV, PREL, TS
SUBJECT: BIOGRAPHIC UPDATE ON SAKHR EL-MATRI, GENIAL INTERLOCUTOR, RAISING HIS PROFILE
REF: A. TUNIS 108
B. 08 TUNIS 97689
Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S/NF) Sakhr El-Matri President Ben Ali's son-in-law attended a reception hosted by the Ambassador May 26. He stayed for two hours talking with a wide variety of the guests, especially the Americans. He made a point of asking who he should know and stay in contact with at the Embassy.
He was a little more reserved with the Tunisian guests, speaking with them but only briefly before moving on. His English was quite good and he clearly enjoyed using it. In general, he presented himself in a low key, genial unassuming manner even though his presence was clearly marked by the guests.
2. (C) El-Matri's profile has been on the rise lately. He was on the cover of the May 25 Jeune Afrique after purchasing Dar Assabah publishing house, which publishes two of Tunisia's main newspapers Assabah and Le Temps, thus adding to his media empire which already includes the Quranic Zeitouna radio. He sat directly behind President Ben Ali during the final soccer match of the Presidential Cup, and he was present when Minister of State and Presidential Advisor Ben Dhia spoke to a gathering of the ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) in Sousse April 26 about government's plans for the upcoming Presidential elections.
3. (SBU) During the reception El-Matri discussed his plans for Assabah and Le Temps saying he had hired a French firm to revamp the look of the papers and that he had hired Faisal Battout, the AFP Bureau Chief in Doha, to be the new Editor of Assabah. He should arrive in Tunis around 15 June.
(Comment: If Battout, who is well known to PA, is allowed to operate independently this is a good sign for the newspapers.) He also mentioned, in the context of discussing the AMIDEAST program, that he had spoken to the President about the importance of English language instruction.
4. (C) On a personal note: El-Matri revealed that he liked exercising but not running. He said he was trying to lose weight, and he drank Diet Coke at the reception. He also said he was starting a new exercise regime and used that as a reason why he had stopped smoking a water pipe. He went out of his way to ask if his new mansion under construction next to the Residence was blocking the sea view of any of his neighbors. El-Matri visited Canada in May during which his wife gave birth to a daughter and a new Canadian citizen. He also purchased a villa at 70 Place Belvedere, Westmont Canada, previous owner Mrs. Leslie Osmond for approximately 2.5 million Canadian dollars.
5. (S/NF) Comment: By accepting the Ambassador's invitation and by staying as long as he did El-Matri was showing his interest in expanding his contacts with the Embassy. Notably El-Matri also invited the Ambassador out to lunch or dinner, which the Ambassador accepted. The Embassy extended the invitation to Sakhr El-Matri in the context of an event targeted at the Ambassador's neighbors in Sidi Bou Said and with the intent to get to know him better.
Godec
Tags: Sakhr El Matri Ben Ali RCD Dar Assabah Faisal Battout AMIDEAST Diplomacy Corruption Abdelaziz Ben Dhia Robert F. Godec

! Posted in Family Affairs | Comments(0)»
Got asks europeans not to take Tunisian Guantanamo detainees November 27th, 2010
09TUNIS415 Date23/06/2009 03:49 OriginEmbassy Tunis ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #0415/01 1741549
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 231549Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6474
RUEAWJA/DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 0186
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0546
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0804

Content
S E C R E T TUNIS 000415
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE:NEA/MAG (SWILLIAMS, MNARDI, MHAYES)
ALSO FOR DRL:KMCGEENEY, S/WIC:ARICCI
PASS DOD/OSD:ALIOTTA, DOJ/ODAG:MSTRANSKY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2019
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, KDRG, PTER, TS
SUBJECT: GOT ASKS EUROPEANS NOT TO TAKE TUNISIAN GUANTANAMO DETAINEES
REF:A. TUNIS 407
B. TUNIS 339
C. TUNIS 32
D. 08 TUNIS 1137 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
1. (S/NF) A senior MFA official convoked the German, Italian and Spanish Chiefs of Mission June 19 to inform them the GOT wants the Tunisian detainees in Guantanamo Camp returned home. According to the European COMs, the implicit message was that their governments should not accept the US request to take Tunisian detainees. The COMs have informed their capitals, but have no response yet. In a meeting June 22, a small group of Ambassadors (including the German and Italian COMs) discussed the MFA demarches. Among the Ambassadors, views differed on the risks to Tunisian prisoners, but some said there is a possibility of torture or mistreatment for anyone accused of terrorism. End Summary.
-------------------
EUROPEANS DEMARCHED
-------------------
2. (S) Following FM Abdallah's meeting on Guantanamo detainees with Ambassador Godec on June 18 (Ref A), the MFA convoked German Ambassador Horst-Wolfram Kerll, Italian Ambassador Antonio D'Andria and Spanish Charge Santiago Miralles Huete to separate meetings on June 19.
3. (S) In the meetings, MFA Secretary of State for Maghreb, Arab and African Affairs Abdelhafidh Hergeum delivered a demarche similar to that given to Ambassador Godec, specifically:
-- Tunisia wants its citizens in Guantanamo returned,
-- Tunisia does not torture and has signed the Convention Against Torture,
-- Tunisia's image would suffer if the detainees were sent to other countries.
The implicit message from Hergeum, according to the European COMs, was that their countries should not agree to the US request to accept Tunisian detainees. The three officials have informed their capitals but have no response. According to the German Ambassador, the Tunisian Ambassador in Berlin has delivered the same demarche to the German MFA.
-------------------
AMBASSADORS' MEETING
-------------------
4. (S) On June 22, Ambassador discussed the GOT demarche with Ambassador Kerll, Ambassador D'Andria, UK Ambassador Chris O'Connor, French Ambassador Serge Degallaix, and Canadian Ambassador Bruno Picard. Ambassador Godec reviewed the Foreign Minister's demarche with the German and Italian Ambassadors then detailing the demarches they had received.
5. (S/NF) The Canadian Ambassador noted the GOT has offered, as evidence that it does not torture, the case of Imam Said Jaziri who was repatriated from Canada to Tunisia despite allegations that he would be mistreated. The Canadian Ambassador said the comparison between Jaziri and the Guantanamo detainees is "crap", explaining that Jaziri was a petty criminal and not accused of terrorism. The Canadian government reviewed Jaziri's case carefully and decided he could be transferred since he did have links with terrorism.
The Canadian decision, Picard suggested, might well have been otherwise if Jaziri had been accused of terrorism.
6. (S/NF) The Italian Ambassador said Italy had had few problems with individuals they had transferred to Tunisia.
The Italians have been in contact with their families and lawyers and have not heard any serious complaints. Why, he asked, would the GOT want to mistreat or torture transferred Guantanamo detainees?
7. (S/NF) Ambassador Godec noted that there are credible
reports of one of the first two transferees being mistreated, including information from the lawyer, the family and statements in open court. Moreover, there are credible reports of Ministry of Interior officials mistreating detainees and prisoners in other cases. He added that contrary to GOT claims, the ICRC cannot visit all Tunisian prisons as it does not have access to non-notified MOI facilities. The UK Ambassador opined that the GOT uses torture as a form of punishment.
8. (S/NF) The Canadian Ambassador said the GOT's statements that it does not torture are "bullshit." The Canadian Ambassador (protect) said he had direct, first hand evidence of torture/mistreatment of a prisoner that lasted several months. The Canadian and German Ambassadors agreed that anyone in Tunisian prisons on terrorism charges is at risk of mistreatment or torture.
9. (S/NF) The Ambassadors concluded the discussion with several noting that Tunisian diplomatic assurances regarding appropriate treatment of prisoners is of value, but that a follow-up mechanism is required to ensure commitments are kept.
-------
COMMENT
-------
10. (S/NF) The GOT clearly and strongly wants the Tunisian detainees in Guantanamo returned home. As we suggested in Ref A, Washington agencies may wish to consider whether to offer to return the Tunisian detainees if the GOT agrees to permit US access to the first two transferees and ongoing access to any future transferees. Such an understanding would need to include a mechanism to address the problems that may arise. While there is no absolute guarantee against mistreatment, such an understanding would provide transferees additional protection. Whether the GOT would accept such an arrangement is another matter. We are not optimistic, but it is worth considering. If Washington decides to continue with efforts to transfer the Tunisian detainees to third countries, we need to officially inform the GOT at a high-level and soon.
Godec
Tags: Abdelhafidh Hergeum Diplomacy Torture Germany Italy Spain Guantanamo Detainee Canada Maghreb Kerll D'Andria Chris O'Connor UK Serge Degallaix Bruno Picard Robert F. Godec Europe

Posted in Guantanamo | Comments(0)»
Politics Rattle the Tunisian-American chamber of commerce November 27th, 2010
09TUNIS454 Date09/07/2009 04:30 OriginEmbassy Tunis ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #0454/01 1901630
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 091630Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6520
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

Content
S E C R E T TUNIS 000454
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EEB/IFD/OMA, EEB/EPPD, AND NEA/MAG (HAYES)
STATE PASS USTR (BURKHEAD) AND USAID (MCCLOUD)
USDOC FOR ITA/MAC/ONE (MASON), ADVOCACY CTR (TABINE), AND
CLDP (TEJTEL AND MCMANUS)
USDOC PASS USPTO (ADAMS, BROWN AND MARSHALL)
CASABLANCA FOR FCS (ORTIZ)
CAIRO FOR FINANCIAL ATTACHE (SEVERENS)
LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2019
TAGS: ECON, EFIN, EINV, ETRD, TS
SUBJECT: POLITICS RATTLE THE TUNISIAN-AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
Summary
-------
1. (C/NF) What was to be a routine Elective General Assembly for the Tunisian-American Chamber of Commerce turned out to be less so when TACC's President, Mondher Ben Ayed, announced he was not running for re-election. Popular among the membership and credited for repairing TACC's broken finances, Ben Ayed cited "health" reasons as the impetus for his departure. A week later, the TACC board, now made up of eleven Tunisian and nine American companies, elected the relatively unknown Nazeh Ben Ammar, head of a Tunisian textile company, as the new president. Ben Ayed met privately with the Ambassador and revealed he chose to step down because of the political risks involved in the position.
He said the GOT viewed TACC as a "political organization" because of its role as a Tunisian interface with the U.S.
Embassy. Unfortunately, at least one U.S. company is thinking twice about participating in TACC, citing nervousness about how the GOT views the organization. TACC's future plans seem to be business as usual - work on the various committees, strengthening bilateral business relations, and a door-knock lobbying mission to the United States in October. It remains to be seen if new leadership will translate into any change for the role of TACC in Tunisia. End Summary.
----------------
TACC's New Board
----------------
2. (U) On June 18, the Tunisian-American Chamber of Commerce (TACC) held their Elective General Assembly, electing the new 20-member board of the organization. Eleven Tunisian and nine American companies presented themselves as candidates and were unanimously voted in by acclamation from the membership. Among the U.S. companies are Coca-Cola, Citibank, Cisco, and Pfizer (please see complete list of board members in Para 9). TACC is not yet an official American Chamber of Commerce, in part because they do not have a U.S. company president nor do American companies make up half of the board. In 2007, TACC was able to recruit a sizeable number of U.S. companies to the board who had not participated in TACC previously.
--------------------------------------------- --------------
Presidential Politics: Surprise Resignations and Candidates
--------------------------------------------- --------------
3. (C/NF) The Elective General Assembly went largely as expected except for the surprise announcement that Mondher Ben Ayed, TACC President, would not run for re-election. He cited "health reasons." From its birth in 1989 until 2007, TACC had only one president, Moncef Barouni. The organization had weathered periods of financial mismanagement and dwindling membership until Ben Ayed was elected. Ben Ayed was instrumental in leading TACC out of their financial woes and into the black again, to the point where TACC is today turning over a considerable profit. Under Ben Ayed's leadership, TACC also expanded U.S. company membership, created an English-language training program, and strengthened ties with the Embassy.
4. (C/NF) As soon as Ben Ayed made his announcement, speculation ran rampant as to why he stepped down and who would step into his place. Rym Bedoui (protect), owner of Agora Foods, a food processing plant, privately told the Embassy she was interested in running for the position. She told the Embassy that she had begun lobbying board members for support when Ben Ayed summoned her into his office and urged her to stay on as Secretary General. Bedoui also sought out a meeting with Slim Zarrouk, a well-connected businessman with ties to the GOT, who told her "they" viewed her as too pro-U.S. and that "they" weren't comfortable with her as TACC President for "security reasons." Bedoui took Zarrouk's comments to mean the GOT didn't want someone seen as pro-U.S. leading TACC in the run-up to the October 2009 elections. Bedoui also added that Ben Ayed has strong business ties with Zarrouk.
5. (C/NF) On June 25, the new TACC board members convened to vote on their new leadership. Nazeh Ben Ammar, owner of a textile company and prior member-at-large on the TACC board, ran for the Presidency unopposed. In a private meeting with the Ambassador, Ben Ayed shared that Ben Ammar had been a safe choice, and the most likely to push TACC forward on its commercial projects. Sami Smaoui, head of Hewlett-Packard in Tunisia, noted the choice of Ben Ammar was odd, in that most TACC presidents had served on the executive board before in some capacity. Ben Ammar paid a courtesy call on the Embassy on July 1 and offered his assurance that cooperation would remain fruitful.
-------------------------------------
Nervousness About Embassy Involvement
-------------------------------------
6. (S/NF) In his meeting with the Ambassador, Ben Ayed said he stepped down from TACC as a personal choice. Despite the Embassy's purely economic and commercial involvement with the organization, he said the GOT viewed TACC not as a regular chamber of commerce, but as an interface between Tunisia and the U.S. Embassy. Ben Ayed said he defended the Ambassador and the Embassy in face of criticism from "some" in the GOT, but that it was getting "dangerous" for him and the job carried risks.
7. (C) Since its inception, the Embassy has had an honorary, non-voting seat on the TACC Board. Although the Embassy had been invited in years prior to count votes in the Executive Board meeting (to elect leadership), this year the Embassy was only invited to the June 18 Elective General Assembly.
Smaoui voiced his concern over this at the Executive Board meeting and asked why the Embassy was not invited. Ben Ayed replied that this was TACC internal business and there was no need for the Embassy to be there. TACC did, however, invite the Embassy to their July 6 board meeting and acted as if it was business as usual. In a separate meeting with Econ/Commercial Officer, Sami Smaoui said he was nervous he didn't know exactly how the GOT viewed TACC, and said that he was increasingly disillusioned that TACC was turning into a "Tunisian business organization." If things continued on the current path, he said, he would not run for a spot on the board again.
------------------------
Upcoming TACC Activities
------------------------
8. (U) In the July 6 board meeting, Ben Ammar discussed staffing TACC's committees: the Tunisian Company Committee, whose purpose is to promote exports to the U.S.; the US Company Committee, facilitating links with U.S. companies;
the Fundraising and Activities Committee; the MENA Council Committee, promoting ties with chambers in other Middle East and North African Countries; and the Legal Committee. TACC is planning a door-knock mission to the United States in October, where it will lobby members of congress and key USG agencies to raise awareness about Tunisia and improve contacts. TACC has asked for Embassy assistance, as in the past, to organize this trip.
--------------------
TACC 2009-2010 Board
--------------------
9. (U) AMERICAN COMPANIES
- Starz Electronics
- Citibank
- Cisco
- Crown Maghreb Can
- Pfizer
- BST/Coca-Cola
- BMS/UPSA
- Hewlett-Packard Maghreb
- Devonshire Investors
TUNISIAN COMPANIES
- Tunisie Courtage
- Finest Food
- Mami
- AB Consulting
- Maille Fil
- Mazars
- Dahmani Transit International
- Hotel Imperial Marhaba
- Taams
- Hexabyte
- Kallel and Associates
-------
Comment
-------
10. (C) Mondher Ben Ayed's resignation is unfortunate but not wholly suprising given the intense political nature of Tunisia in the run-up to the October 2009 elections. Given that the Embassy's engagement with TACC has been solely economic and commercial, the fact that the GOT views TACC as "political" provides insight into the regime and its thinking. Ben Ayed has kept TACC firmly focused on commercial matters, and has done an excellent job rebuilding the organization. Unfortunately, all organizations in today's Tunisia are seen through a political lens. There are two key questions after these latest developments. First, whether they will affect TACC's ability to operate effectively. And, second, whether American companies will conclude they are better off disassociating themselves from TACC to avoid an unnecessary political risk. We will have the answers in due course. In the meantime, however, we believe the TACC election, which should have been simple and straightforward, does not bode well for the organization or for Tunisia. End Comment.
Godec
Tags: Economy TACC Mondher Ben Ayed Nazeh Ben Ammar Elections Ben Ali Slim Zarrouk Nazeh Ben Ammar Sami Smaoui Middle East North Africa Robert F. Godec

Posted in Politics | Comments(0)»
Red Cross says a former Guantanamo detainee needs treatment November 27th, 2010
ID09TUNIS472 Date15/07/2009 04:20 OriginEmbassy Tunis ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #0472 1961620
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 151620Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6543
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

Content
S E C R E T TUNIS 000472
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG (MHAYES), DRL (KMCGEENEY), AND S/WIC
(ARICCI)
PASS DOD/OSD (ALIOTTA)
PASS DOJ/ODAG (MSTRANSKY)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2019
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, KDRG, TS
SUBJECT: ICRC SAYS A FORMER GUANTANAMO DETAINEE NEEDS TREATMENT
REF: A. TUNIS 407
B. TUNIS 399
C. 08 TUNIS 1137
D. 08 TUNIS 992
E. 07 TUNIS 1483
F. 07 TUNIS 1448
G. 07 TUNIS 1425
H. 07 TUNIS 1060
Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and(d)
1. (S/NF) The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Tunisian Coordinator for Regional Protection Francesco Bruscoli (strictly protect) informed acting P/E Counselor July 14 on the margins of a reception that the ICRC had recently visited the two former Guantanamo detainees imprisoned in Tunisia. He said that Abdallah Ben Omar (al-Hajji) is still suffering psychologically, is not coherent, and needs treatment. He said Ben Omar was suffering from his cumulative experience over the last seven years (Refs C-H). He was not more precise about the treatment Ben Omar needs, and had no comments regarding Lufti Bin Swei Lagha.
2. (S/NF) Bruscoli asked about the status of the remaining 10 Tunisian Guantanamo detainees. Pol/Econ Chief mentioned that there had been news articles about USG discussions with Germany, Italy and others about possibly accepting Tunisian detainees. In that context, Bruscoli said the German Embassy was seeking assurances from the GOT regarding treatment of returnees but was not satisfied with the response so far.
3. (C) Regarding other ICRC work, he said they would soon begin a new project aimed at reducing the number of Tunisians going into the prison system. He said the necessary laws are already on the books but need to be implemented. They have GOT support for this project which will begin on a trial basis in one of the smaller provinces. The project will work to reduce the number of people in prison through both pre-sentencing measures including limiting pre-trial detention and sentencing measures that might provide more alternatives to prison sentences.
4. (S/NF) Comment: It is highly unusual for ICRC officials to be so frank regarding the former Guantanamo detainees and presumably indicates serious ICRC concern about Ben Omar's condition. We will seek a follow-up meeting with Francesco Bruscoli.
Godec
Tags: Guantanamo Terrorism Torture Detainees Robert F. Godec Francesco Bruscoli Abdallah Ben Omar Lufti Lagha Germany The International Committee of the Red Cross

Posted in Guantanamo | Comments(0)»
Troubled Tunisia: What should we do? November 27th, 2010
09TUNIS492 Date17/07/2009 04:19 OriginEmbassy Tunis ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
VZCZCXRO0363

PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTU #0492/01 1981619
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 171619Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6565
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TUNIS 000492
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA AA/S FELTMAN, DAS HUDSON, AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE
GRAY, AND NEA/MAG FROM AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2029
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, KPAO, MASS, PHUM, TS
SUBJECT: TROUBLED TUNISIA: WHAT SHOULD WE DO?
Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for E.O. 12958 reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).
-------
Summary
-------
1. (S/NF) By many measures, Tunisia should be a close US ally. But it is not. While we share some key values and the country has a strong record on development, Tunisia has big problems. President Ben Ali is aging, his regime is sclerotic and there is no clear successor. Many Tunisians are frustrated by the lack of political freedom and angered by First Family corruption, high unemployment and regional inequities. Extremism poses a continuing threat.
Compounding the problems, the GOT brooks no advice or criticism, whether domestic or international. Instead, it seeks to impose ever greater control, often using the police.
The result: Tunisia is troubled and our relations are too.
2. (S/NF) In the past three years, US Mission Tunis has responded by offering greater cooperation where the Tunisians say they want it, but not shied from making plain the need for change. We have had some successes, notably in the commercial and military assistance areas. But we have also had failures. We have been blocked, in part, by a Foreign Ministry that seeks to control all our contacts in the government and many other organizations. Too often, the GOT prefers the illusion of engagement to the hard work of real cooperation. Major change in Tunisia will have to wait for Ben Ali's departure, but President Obama and his policies create opportunities now. What should we do to take advantage of them? We recommend:
-- keep a strong focus on democratic reform and respect for human rights, but shift the way we promote these goals;
-- seek to engage the GOT in a dialogue on issues of mutual interest, including trade and investment, Middle East peace, and greater Maghreb integration;
-- offer Tunisians (with an emphasis on youth) more English-language training, educational exchanges, and cultural programs;
-- move our military assistance away from FMF, but look for new ways to build security and intelligence cooperation; and,
-- increase high-level contacts but stress that deeper US cooperation depends on real Tunisian engagement. End Summary.
--------------------------------------------- -----
The Backdrop: Historic Relations and Shared Values
--------------------------------------------- -----
3. (SBU) The United States and Tunisia have 200 years of close ties and common interests, including advancing regional peace, combating terrorism, and building prosperity. Since independence, Tunisia deserves credit for its economic and social progress. Without the natural resources of its neighbors, Tunisia focused on people and diversified its economy. In a success all too rare, the GOT is effective in delivering services (education, health care, infrastructure and security) to its people. The GOT has sought to build a &knowledge economy8 to attract FDI that will create high value-added jobs. As a result, the country has enjoyed five percent real GDP growth for the past decade. On women's rights, Tunisia is a model. And, Tunisia has a long history of religious tolerance, as demonstrated by its treatment of its Jewish community. While significant challenges remain (above all the country's 14 percent unemployment rate) on balance Tunisia has done better than most in the region.
4. (SBU) On foreign policy, Tunisia has long played a moderate role (although recently its goal has been to &get along with everyone8). The GOT rejects the Arab League boycott of Israeli goods. Although it broke ties with Israel in 2000, the GOT has from time to time taken part in quiet discussions with Israeli officials. The GOT also supports Mahmoud Abbas' leadership of the Palestinian Authority.
Tunisia participated in the Annapolis conference and has supported our efforts to promote Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The GOT is like-minded on Iran, is an ally in the fight against terrorism, and has maintained an Embassy in Iraq at the Charge level. Moreover, Tunisia recently signed a debt forgiveness agreement with the GOI on Paris Club terms; it is the first Arab country to do so.
5. (SBU) Finally, although Tunisians have been deeply angry over the war in Iraq and perceived US bias towards Israel, most still admire the &the American dream.8 Despite the anger at US foreign policy, we see a growing desire for English-language instruction, a wish for more educational and
TUNIS 00000492 002 OF 005
scientific exchanges, and a belief in the American culture of innovation. Tunisians see these as important for their future.
--------------------------------------------- --------
The Problem: A Sclerotic Regime and Growing Corruption
--------------------------------------------- ---------
6. (C) Despite Tunisia's economic and social progress, its record on political freedoms is poor. Tunisia is a police state, with little freedom of expression or association, and serious human rights problems. The GOT can point to some political progress in the last decade, including an end to prior review of books and ICRC access to many prisons. But for every step forward there has been another back, for example the recent takeover of important private media outlets by individuals close to President Ben Ali.
7. (C) The problem is clear: Tunisia has been ruled by the same president for 22 years. He has no successor. And, while President Ben Ali deserves credit for continuing many of the progressive policies of President Bourguiba, he and his regime have lost touch with the Tunisian people. They tolerate no advice or criticism, whether domestic or international. Increasingly, they rely on the police for control and focus on preserving power. And, corruption in the inner circle is growing. Even average Tunisians are now keenly aware of it, and the chorus of complaints is rising.
Tunisians intensely dislike, even hate, First Lady Leila Trabelsi and her family. In private, regime opponents mock her; even those close to the government express dismay at her reported behavior. Meanwhile, anger is growing at Tunisia's high unemployment and regional inequities. As a consequence, the risks to the regime's long-term stability are increasing.
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
US-Tunisian Relations: If Only We Would Say This Is Paradise
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
8. (S/NF) US-Tunisian relations reflect the realities of the Ben Ali regime. On the positive side, we have accomplished several goals in recent years, including:
-- increasing substantially US assistance to the military to combat terrorism;
-- improving (albeit still with challenges) some important counterterrorism programs;
-- strengthening commercial ties, including holding a TIFA Council meeting, hosting several trade and economic delegations and growing business activity;
-- building ties to young people and the cultural community through expanded English-language programs, a new film festival, and new media outreach efforts; and
-- encouraging congressional interest in Tunisia.
9. (C) But we have also had too many failures. The GOT frequently declines to engage, and there have been too many lost opportunities. The GOT has:
-- declined to engage on the Millennium Challenge Account;
-- declined USAID regional programs to assist young people;
-- reduced the number of Fulbright scholarship students; and,
-- declined to engage in Open Skies negotiations.
Most troubling has been the GOT's unilateral and clumsy effort to impose new and retroactive taxes on the American Cooperative School of Tunis. There is little doubt that this action was at the behest of powerful friends (probably including Leila Trabelsi) of the International School of Carthage. It raises important questions about Tunisian governance and our friendship. If, in the end, the GOT's actions force the school to close we will need to downsize the Mission, limit our programs, and dial down our relations.
10. (C) At the same time, the GOT has also increasingly tightened controls that make it exceptionally difficult for the US Mission to conduct business. The controls, put in place by Foreign Minister Abdallah, require the Mission to obtain written MFA permission for contact with all official and semi-official Tunisian organizations. Mid-level GOT officials are no longer allowed to communicate with embassy personnel without express authorization and MFA-cleared instructions. All meeting requests and demarches must be conveyed by diplomatic note. Most go unanswered. All Embassies in Tunis are affected by these controls, but they are no less frustrating for that.
11. (C) Beyond the stifling bureaucratic controls, the GOT makes it difficult for the Mission to maintain contact with a wide swath of Tunisian society. GOT-controlled newspapers often attack Tunisian civil society activists who participate in Embassy activities, portraying them as traitors.
Plain-clothes police sometimes lurk outside events hosted by EmbOffs, intimidating participants. In one example of the GOT's tactics, we awarded a local grant through MEPI to a Tunisian woman, but her boss at the Commerce Ministry told her not to pursue it. She persisted for a time, but backed out when she began receiving anonymous death threats.
12. (C) Some of the GOT's actions may be related to its intense dislike of the former Administration's &freedom agenda.8 The GOT considered this policy dangerous and believed it opened the door for Islamic extremists to seize power. GOT leaders have made no secret of their disapproval of the Ambassador's and other EmbOffs' contacts with opposition party leaders -- in particular the Progressive Democratic Party's Nejib Chebbi, the object of President Ben Ali's intense personal animus -- as well as civil society activists who criticize the regime. They were intensely critical, as well, of the previous Administration's use of public statements (such as on World Press Freedom Day 2008), which they believed unfairly targeted Tunisia.
----------------------
So, What Should We Do?
----------------------
13. (C) Notwithstanding the frustrations of doing business here, we cannot write off Tunisia. We have too much at stake. We have an interest in preventing al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other extremist groups from establishing a foothold here. We have an interest in keeping the Tunisian military professional and neutral. We also have an interest in fostering greater political openness and respect for human rights. It is in our interest, too, to build prosperity and Tunisia's middle class, the underpinning for the country's long-term stability. Moreover, we need to increase mutual understanding to help repair the image of the United States and secure greater cooperation on our many regional challenges. The United States needs help in this region to promote our values and policies. Tunisia is one place where, in time, we might find it.
-----------------
The Extended Hand
-----------------
14. (C) Since President Obama's inauguration, Tunisians have been more receptive to the United States. Senior GOT officials have warmly welcomed President Obama's statements and speeches. His address in Cairo drew particular praise, with the Foreign Minister calling it &courageous.8 Meanwhile, some civil society contacts who had been boycotting Embassy functions in opposition to the war in Iraq have started coming around again. Generally, the metaphor of the &extended hand8 in President Obama's inaugural address has resonated powerfully with Tunisians. Concretely, the Tunisians have welcomed many of the Obama Administration's actions, including the decision to close the Guantanamo Bay detention center and the plans for troop withdrawals from Iraq. Above all, Tunisians have been pleased by the President's tone, statements and actions (so far) on Middle East peace.
-----------------------------------------
How To Advance Democracy and Human Rights
-----------------------------------------
15. (S) The Obama Administration creates an important opportunity, then, to explore whether and how to pursue a more productive bilateral relationship. GOT officials say the United States tends to focus on issues where we do not see eye-to-eye. They bristle at our calls for greater democratic reform and respect for human rights, and protest they are making progress. For years, the Embassy's top goal has been to promote progress in these areas. We need to keep the focus, especially with 2009 an election year in Tunisia.
Ben Ali is certain to be reelected by a wide margin in a process that will be neither free nor fair. In this context, we should continue to underscore the importance of these issues, and to maintain contacts with the few opposition parties and civil society groups critical of the regime.
16. (C) We should consider how this policy objective is publicly manifested, however. For several years, the United States has been out in front -- publicly and privately -criticizing the GOT for the absence of democracy and the lack of respect for human rights. There is a place for such criticism, and we do not advocate abandoning it. We do recommend a more pragmatic approach, however, whereby we would speak to the Tunisians very clearly and at a very high level about our concerns regarding Tunisia's democracy and human rights practices, but dial back the public criticism.
The key element is more and frequent high-level private candor. We recommend being explicit with GOT leaders that we are changing our approach, while also making clear that we will continue to engage privately with opposition parties and civil society.
17. (C) In addition, we should increase our efforts to persuade our European partners, and other like-minded countries, to step up their efforts to persuade the GOT to accelerate political reform. While some in the EU (e.g., Germany, the UK) agree with us, key countries such as France and Italy have shied from putting pressure on the GOT. We should work to get them to do so, and to condition further assistance and advanced EU associate status on it.
----------------------------
Advancing Other US Interests
----------------------------
18. (C) Whether we succeed on democracy and human rights, the United States has an interest in building relations with a wide spectrum of Tunisians, particularly the young. To do so, and to build good will with the GOT, we should offer the government a dialogue on a range of issues of mutual interest, backed up by increased assistance. Of greatest interest to the GOT would be increased engagement on economic issues, i.e., on increasing bilateral trade and investment, as well as the provision of technical assistance, especially involving technology transfer. The Tunisians would welcome a revival of the US-North African Economic Partnership, as well as other efforts that would promote North African economic integration.
19. (C) In addition, we should offer serious engagement in high-priority areas for Tunisians that will also benefit the United States, including:
-- more, and more comprehensive, English-language programs;
-- Ph.D. scholarships for Tunisian students to study in the United States, such as those that USAID used to make available in the 1970's and 1980's;
-- more support for University linkages;
-- more science and technology exchanges -- to give substance to a bilateral S&T agreement that, with no money behind it, has had little impact; and
-- more cultural programming.
20. (C) In addition to talking to the GOT, we need to engage directly with the Tunisian people, especially youth. The Embassy is already using Facebook as a communication tool.
In addition, we have the Ambassador's blog, a relatively new undertaking that is attracting attention. Over the past couple of years, the Embassy has substantially increased its outreach to Tunisian youth through concerts, film festivals, and other events. Our information resource center and America's Corners are popular ways for Tunisians to access unfiltered news and information. We should continue and increase such programs.
-------------------------------------------
Advancing Broader Foreign Policy Objectives And Security Cooperation
-------------------------------------------
21. (C) We should also seek new ways to engage Tunisia in pursuit of our broader foreign policy agenda. We believe that the GOT would welcome this kind of engagement, and that it would pay dividends, not only in our bilateral relationship but also on transnational issues. For example, we continue to count on GOT support for our efforts to promote Israel-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab peace. Although Tunisia has limited influence within the Arab League, it remains in the moderate camp, as demonstrated most recently by its refusal to participate in the extraordinary Doha Summit on the situation in Gaza. At appropriate moments, we would recommend doing more to brief the GOT on our efforts in the peace process and to draw them into providing additional support. Special Envoy Mitchell's stop here in April was well received and we should look for ways to continue such consultations.
22. (S/NF) There are opportunities in the area of security cooperation, too. For starters, we know that Tunisia could be doing a better job in sharing intelligence with us about the threat of terrorism in North Africa. This was all too clear when, yet again, the GOT failed recently to share information with us in a timely fashion on a reported plot against US military personnel. GRPO has been taking steps to increase cooperation through liaison channels; while there has been progress, more is possible.
23. (C) On military cooperation, the time has come to shift our military assistance away from FMF to more targeted programs that meet specific needs. There is increasing evidence the Tunisian military does not need FMF to the degree it claims, and in any event it has bought us too little in the way of cooperation. Rather, we should focus on working with the Tunisians to identify a small number of areas were cooperation makes sense. The recent use of the Section 1206 and PKO programs to provide the Tunisian military with ground surveillance radar and unmanned surveillance aircraft is a good example.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
Our Message: Deeper Cooperation Depends On Real Engagement
--------------------------------------------- -------------
24. (S) Tunisia is not an ally today, but we still share important history and values. It is fair to consider Tunisia a friend, albeit cautious, closed and distant. Most importantly, in a region in turmoil, Tunisia has better prospects than most even though it is troubled. In the end, serious change here will have to await Ben Ali's departure.
But President Obama's new tone and policies may create a window of opportunity. We should use it to make overtures to the GOT in areas where they seek our involvement or assistance. And, we should seek to engage all Tunisians (especially the young) in ways that will improve the future for both our countries.
25. (S) To succeed, however, we need resources and commitment from Washington. New and expanded programs will require money and staff to implement them, particularly in public affairs. Senior US Government officials must also be prepared to visit more often than in recent years to engage the Tunisians. Meetings outside Tunisia are a good tool, too. The Secretary's recent meeting with North African Foreign Ministers on the margins of the Gaza Reconstruction Conference in Sharm el-Sheikh provides one model for engagement and offers the added benefit of allowing us to also promote greater Maghreb integration.
26. (S) Finally, we recommend US officials be clear in all meetings with Tunisians: more US cooperation depends on real Tunisian engagement. For too long Tunisia has skated by. A small country, in a tough region, the GOT relies on vague promises of friendship and empty slogans. More can and should be expected of Tunisia. The GOT frequently says it is a US ally and calls for greater US engagement. We should respond clearly: yes, but only if we get genuine help from Tunisia on the challenges that matter to us all. The Tunisian government loves the illusion of engagement. The US government should press for the hard work of real cooperation.